

PROMOTING STABILITY IN CYBERSPACE TO PROMOTE PEACE AND PROSPERITY

MEETING WITH ICANN GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

27 JUNE 2019 ICANN65, MARRAKESH

GCSC MISSION STATEMENT



"To engage the full range of stakeholders to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability, and guide responsible state and nonstate behavior in cyberspace."

TIMELINE FULL COMMISSION MEETINGS

02/17 Launch Munich Security Conference 05/17

Tallinn

11/18 Delhi 05/18 Bratislava 09/18 Singapore 01/19 Geneva 03/19 Kobe 10/19 Addis Ababa 11/19 GCSC

report

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






CALL TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC CORE OF THE INTERNET





"Without prejudice to their rights and obligations, state and non-state actors should not conduct or knowingly allow activity that intentionally and substantially damages the general availability or integrity of the public core of the Internet*, and therefore the stability of cyberspace."

*

ELEMENTS OF THE PUBLIC CORE OF THE INTERNET

- 1. Packet routing and forwarding
- 2. Naming and numbering systems
- 3. The cryptographic mechanisms of security and identity
- 4. Physical transmission media

GCSC NORMS










NORM TO AVOID TAMPERING



NORM FOR STATES TO CREATE A VEP



NORM AGAINST COMMANDEERI NG OF ICT DEVICES INTO BOTNETS



NORM TO REDUCE AND MITIGATE SIGNIFICANT VULNERABILITIES



NORM ON BASIC CYBER HYGIENE AS FOUNDATIONAL DEFENSE



NORM AGAINST OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS BY NON-STATE ACTORS



NORM TO PROTECT THE ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE

STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE

CRITICAL OF CYBERSPACE

CRITICAL IN CYBERSPACE

GCSC NORM ENDORSEMENTS









547 like-minded states, companies and civil society organizations endorse 5 out of 8 GCSC norms, and made special reference to the public core of the Internet

Norm to protect the public core of the Internet part of ENISA's mandate through the EU Cybersecurity Act


The Tech Accord welcomes the GCSC norms, and made special reference to the norm to avoid tampering, norm against commandeering of ICT devices into botnets, and the norm for states to create a VEP

CYBER STABILITY WORKING DEFINITION



Stability of cyberspace is the condition where individuals and institutions can be reasonably confident in their ability to use cyberspace safely and securely, where the availability and integrity of services in cyberspace is generally assured, where change is managed in relative peace, and where tensions are resolved in a non-escalatory manner.

Stability is based on adherence to existing international law (including international human rights law), common understandings of acceptable behavior, transparency, confidence-building measures facilitated through capacity-building, and by the open promulgation and widespread use of technical standards that ensure cyberspace is resilient.





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CALL TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC CORE OF THE INTERNET

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CALL TO PROTECT THE ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE


"State and non-state actors should not pursue, support or allow cyber operations intended to disrupt the technical infrastructure essential to elections, referenda or plebiscites."



NORM TO AVOID TAMPERING



"State and non-state actors should not tamper with products and services in development and production, nor allow them to be tampered with, if doing so may substantially impair the stability of cyberspace."




NORM AGAINST COMMANDEERING OF ICT DEVICES INTO BOTNETS

"State and non-state actors should not commandeer others' ICT resources for use as botnets or for similar purposes."



NORM FOR STATES TO CREATE A VULNERABILITY EQUITIES PROCESS

"States should create procedurally transparent frameworks to assess whether and when to disclose not publicly known vulnerabilities or flaws they are aware of in information systems and technologies. The default presumption should be in favor of disclosure."



NORM TO REDUCE AND MITIGATE SIGNIFICANT VULNERABILITIES

"Developers and producers of products and services on which the stability of cyberspace depends should prioritize security and stability, take reasonable steps to ensure that their products or services are free from significant vulnerabilities, take measures to timely mitigate vulnerabilities that are later discovered and to be transparent about their process. All actors have a duty to share information on vulnerabilities in order to help prevent or mitigate malicious cyber activity."



NORM ON BASIC CYBER HYGIENE AS FOUNDATIONAL DEFENSE

"States should enact appropriate measures, including laws and regulations, to ensure basic cyber hygiene."



NORM AGAINST OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS BY NON-STATE ACTORS

"Non-state actors should not engage in offensive cyber operations and state actors should prevent and respond to such activities if they occur."

UN GGE 2015 REPORT



"While states have a primary responsibility to maintain a secure and peaceful ICT environment, effective international cooperation would benefit from identifying mechanisms for the participation, as appropriate, of the private sector, academia and civil society organizations."