

PSWG Intersessional Meeting – 12-13 February 2018 Chair's Conclusions

I. OBJECTIVES

The Public Safety Working Group of ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), together with cybercrime experts from 25 EU Member States and 3 associated States participating in the EMPACT Programme (European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats), met to address the the impact of the impending reform of the Whois service and protocol, which may entail loss of public access to Whois data. This reform is set to address long-standing data protection concerns, which have become more acute with the coming into effect of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018.

While the focus was on Whois, this meeting was also an opportunity for law enforcement representatives to familiarize themselves with the activities of ICANN and how, within ICANN, law enforcement can influence the development of policies that are applied through contracts, across the domain industry. It also served to provide an introduction to the DNS abuse mitigation work of the GAC PSWG.

II. WHOIS IS CRITICAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS

The public availability of worldwide Whois data from which law enforcement agencies and other legitimate users have benefited for many years, has been the subject of concerns by data protection authorities since 2003. To better protect the privacy of domain name registrants, there is a plan to move to a "layered access" model where personal data (and as likely implemented, even some corporate data) will no longer be publicly accessible.

<u>Several models</u> under consideration in the ICANN community are proposing a wide range of solutions in terms of:

- data collection requirements (what data is collected from registrants of domain name)
- accessibility of data by third parties (including law enforcement among other legitimate users)
- retention of collected data (for maintenance of historical records in particular)

The GAC, the European Commission and the US Government have advised ICANN to adopt solutions that preserve current legitimate uses of public Whois data to the maximum extent possible in compliance with data protection rules, while providing for swift and practical access to non-public data for law enforcement.

As illustrated by the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and Europol, domain registration data made available through the Whois system is critical to law enforcement investigations. While the quality and accuracy of such data is uneven, it is almost always instrumental in generating investigative leads and ultimately attributing crime. Participants also identified the value of Whois data to identify victims of cybercrime. Examples cited included domain owners in cases of hijacked domains (using past Whois data) and in cases of compromised domains (using present-day Whois data). Law enforcement also referred to the use of Whois to identify a child victim of sexual abuse which was rescued using information on the domain name registrant committing the abuse and sharing images of it.

Prepared by the GAC Public Safety Working Group (PSWG) Document date: 1 March 2018

¹ See actual contributions from the <u>GAC</u>, the European Commission (<u>commissioner's letter</u>, <u>comments</u>) and the <u>US Government</u>.



III. LAW ENFORCEMENT NEEDS TO RETAIN FULL ACCESS TO WHOIS DATA, WHILE PROVIDING APPROPRIATE DATA PROTECTION SAFEGUARDS

Participants in the meeting have identified specific needs and challenges that need to be addressed in the implementation of the new GDPR-compliant Whois system, including:

- Scope of personal data collection: investigations show that all data elements can prove valuable, while the data minimization and proportionality principles of the GDPR may require a reduction of the amount of data available
- Practicability of access to non public data: modalities of access to non-public data need to be consistent across all Top-Level Domains (TLDs) and commensurate with high rates of access needed by law enforcement for specific types of investigations (e.g. botnets)
- Cross-referencing, search capabilities and historical records of Whois data: law enforcement
 agencies need replacements for third-party services (such as those available from Domain
 Tools) that used to rely on the public availability of all Whois data. This includes new features
 of Whois, as well as appropriate data retention specifications (including for changes of
 registration information).
- Confidentiality of requests for non-public data: while law enforcement generally recognize
 the greater trustworthiness of registries compared to registrars, requests for non-public data
 by law enforcement should not be identifiable by concerned parties in order to avoid
 compromising investigations
- Cybersecurity firms access: trusted partners in cybercrime investigations need to retain access
 to full data
- National accreditation of law enforcement agencies to access gated data: national
 accreditation would be preferable to a centralised accreditation system as it is best left to
 national governments to assess which law enforcement agencies should be granted which
 competences. However, this could present challenges because each nation has a distinct set
 of law enforcement entities. Some nations have thousands of law enforcement entities at the
 federal, state, and local levels. Implementing such an accreditation system could take
 considerable, time, effort, and resources.

IV. NEXT STEPS IN WHOIS COMPLIANCE WITH GDPR

The PSWG in collaboration with the GAC is preparing to assist in providing feedback and guidance regarding the selected model soon to be chosen by ICANN and implementation thereof.

To that effect, the PSWG is currently refining a set of Law Enforcement Requirements for a Future Layered Access Model which it has started discussing with interested parties in the industry and the technical community. Further outreach is planned to other parts of the community. These requirements could form a basis for discussions also with data protection and technical experts to determine data protection-compliant solutions and identify the most privacy-protective means of implementation.

Prepared by the GAC Public Safety Working Group (PSWG) Document date: 1 March 2018



V. PSWG WORK PLAN AND OUTREACH

Law enforcement participants also discussed the workplan of the PSWG which lays out the future work for the period 2018-2019 in order to achieve its 4 strategic objectives:

- 1. Developing capabilities of the ICANN and Law Enforcement communities to prevent and mitigate abuse involving the DNS as a key resource
- 2. Ensuring continued accessibility and improved accuracy of domain registration information that is consistent with applicable privacy regulatory frameworks
- 3. Building effective and resilient PSWG operations
- 4. Developing participation in PSWG Work and ensuring appropriate stakeholder input

A number of opportunities for improving the outreach of the PSWG to law enforcement practitioners have been identified, including:

- Informing about opportunities for contributions to ICANN public comments
- Offering webinar on issues of interest to law enforcement as well as material explaining the role of the PSWG in ICANN's multi-stakeholder model
- Creating a law enforcement Internet governance mailing list to support the involvement of law enforcement representatives that are not yet members of the PSWG
- Creating a monthly PSWG newsletter that provides updates on current activities and issues of interest
- Identifying opportunities for input to PSWG work

VI. LIST OF PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES (ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

Austria Italy

Belgium Luxemburg Bulgaria The Netherlands

Canada Norway Poland Cyprus Czech Republic **Portugal** Denmark Romania Estonia Slovenia **Finland** Spain Sweden France Switzerland Germany Greece **United Kingdom United States** Hungary

Ireland Zambia



ANNEXED DOCUMENTS

- 1. Agenda of day 1 of the meeting (12 February 2018)
- 2. Agenda of day 2 of the meeting (13 February 2018)
- 3. Draft Proposal for minimum requirements for LEA access to a future layered access model to non-public domain registration data (as of 9 February 2018)
- 4. Draft PSWG Work Plan (as of 26 February 2018)
- 5. PSWG presentation material (selected meeting slides)
- 6. Presentation of ICANN (meeting slides)

Brussels, 5 January 2018 HOME.D.4/CBB

Members of the ICANN GAC PSWG Members of the EMPACT Priority on Cyber Attacks

Subject: GAC PSWG intersessional meeting on the future of WHOIS and DNS abuse mitigation

Dear PSWG members, dear EMPACT participants,

For many years, law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have relied on WHOIS services, which provide publicly available domain name registrations information. The WHOIS is a key tool to investigate and attribute crime. Data Protection Agencies have long identified issues with the public availability of personal data contained in the WHOIS; nonetheless, the ICANN community has not yet managed to come to agreement on any replacement policy, and LEA access to such data has been largely unaffected. This is now set to change fundamentally in the coming months, before the entry into effect of the EU GDPR on 25th May 2018.

To discuss the latest developments around WHOIS and DNS abuse, their impact on public safety stakeholders, and possible measures to mitigate this impact, the European Commission would like to invite you to **Brussels, Belgium**, for an intersessional ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee Public Safety Working Group (GAC PSWG) meeting which will take place on 12th February 2018. This workshop will bring together members of the GAC PSWG and representatives of EU Member States' law enforcement agencies participating in the EMPACT priority on cyber attacks; it should result in a better understanding of the needs of these two groups and concrete measures to take them into account. The language of the meeting will be English; no translation will be provided.

We will also use this opportunity to review progress on measures for prevention and mitigation of Domain Name System abuse and identify next steps, as well as to discuss the work plan and outreach for the GAC PSWG. This should also extend to how better to integrate public safety stakeholders unable to participate in face-to-face ICANN meetings.

Please find enclosed the draft agenda of the day. If you intend to participate, please register until 18th January 2018 using the following form: https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/PSWG.

The European Commission will reimburse one participant per EU Member State for EMPACT members and up to 15 members of the PSWG (topic leads have priority; the remaining reimbursements will be attributed according to the time of registration [first come, first serve]). Please do not make your own booking for travel or hotel; our contractor will be in touch with you to arrange your travel.

For the EMPACT participants, please note for your travel plans that Europol plans to organise a related workshop on 13 February in Brussels for which you may wish to stay on. Further information on this workshop will be provided by Europol directly.

Please contact our functional mailbox <u>HOME-NOTIFICATIONS-D4@ec.europa.eu</u> for any questions regarding the registration or reimbursement.

We look forward to discussing these important issues with you and count on your numerous and active participation in the event.

Yours sincerely,

Cathrin BAUER-BULST Deputy Head of Unit

Cathrin Sauce-Sulst

Co-Chair, GAC PSWG

Encl.: Agenda of the workshop on 12th February 2018.

PSWG Intersessional Meeting on 12th February 2018 Agenda

Time: Monday, 12th February 2018, 10:00 h to 18:00 h.

Place: Albert Borschette Congress Center (<u>CCAB</u>), Room 1B, rue Froissart 36, 1040 Etterbeek.

Participants will have to undergo a security check which includes a visual inspection with X-rays.

Time	Issue	Leader			
10:00 h	Welcome and opening of the workshop	Cathrin BAUER-BULST (EC)			
10:10 h	Presentation of the WHOIS model(s) received (and possibly chosen) by ICANN	TBD			
10:30 h	Needs of law enforcement (LE)	Grégory MOUNIER (Europol)			
11:00 h	Coffee break				
11:20 h	Discussion of the model(s) and their fulfilment of LE needs (part 1)	Cathrin BAUER-BULST (EC)/Laureen KAPIN (US FTC)			
12:50 h	Lunch break				
13:40 h	Discussion of the model(s) and their fulfilment of LE needs (part 2)	Cathrin BAUER-BULST (EC)/Laureen KAPIN (US FTC)			
14:40 h	DNS abuse mitigation	Iranga KAHANGAMA (US FBI)			
15:40 h	Coffee break				
16:00 h	PSWG Work Plan and Outreach	Cathrin BAUER-BULST (EC)/Grégory MOUNIER and Sara MARCOLLA (Europol)			
18:00 h	Closing	Cathrin BAUER-BULST (EC)			

The Hague, 25/01/18 EDOC#941193-v2

AGENDA

GAC PSWG-EMPACT meeting on the future of WHOIS and DNS abuse mitigation – Day 2: RDAP

Date(s) 13 February 2018	Start: 9:00	End: 13:00
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Place DG HOME, Falcone/Borsellino on the ground floor of

the LX46 building.

Participants EUCTF delegates, Private Partners, DG HOME, ICANN

EC3 staff

Time	Subject	Responsible
09:00 - 09:10	Welcome note and opening of the meeting	Gregory Mounier EUROPOL Cathrin Bauer-Bulst DG HOME
09:10 - 10:00	Presentation of the RDAP pilot project	Francisco Arias ICANN
10:00 - 11:00	RDAP Implementation - Verisign	Marc Anderson and Rick Wilhelm Verisign
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee Break	
11:30 - 12:45	Discussion: LEA requirements	Tour de table
12:45 - 13:00	Conclusion End of meeting	Gregory Mounier EUROPOL

Background paper

Minimum requirements for LEA access to a future layered access model to domain registration data

1. Aim

- To receive feedback from the EU law enforcement community on practical requirements for LEA access to non-public WHOIS information.
- To prepare the discussion with VERISIGN on the RDAP pilot programme on 13th February 2018.

Do you have experience using gated/layered access systems, e.g. on the basis of credentials assigned to you personally or to your organisation? Which requirements exist for your organisation? Could you please prepare comments on the minimum requirements proposed on page 3 (part 4)?

2. Background

For many years, law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have relied on WHOIS services, which provide publicly available domain name registrations information to investigate and attribute crime online.

Data Protection Agencies have taken issue with the public availability of personal data contained in the WHOIS¹; nonetheless ICANN policy related to WHOIS in gTLDs has not evolved significantly as the community did not manage to come to agreement on any replacement policy, and LEA access to such data has been largely unaffected.

This is now set to change fundamentally with the entry into effect of the EU GDPR on 25 May 2018. A growing body of legal opinions² recognizes that collection and publication of personal data contained in the WHOIS database is unlawful and that compliance with GDPR will likely involve reducing the number of data elements collected and implementing purpose-based access to differentiated subsets of the remaining registration data, also known as **layered access**.

As a consequence, while the legitimacy of law enforcement access to registration data, including personal data, for investigations purposes is generally not challenged, LEA access to such data will be affected, both from a practical and from a legal perspective. Practically speaking, there will be fewer data elements and therefore fewer leads available. Cross-referencing data elements across different registrations, e.g. to identify which other domains a bad actor may have registered using the same information, would likely no longer be possible.

Currently under consideration are the following models:

¹ https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/falque-pierrotin-to-chalaby-marby-06Dec17-en.pdf

 $[\]frac{1}{2} \frac{\text{https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gdpr-memorandum-part1-16oct17-en.pdf;}}{\text{https://gnso.icann.org/en/drafts/wsgr-icann-memorandum-25sep17-en.pdf}}$

- a model where every WHOIS lookup would require an individualized request justifying the purpose for access, specific data elements sought, etc., possibly validated by a judge;
- a model where some form of authentication would be provided, allowing access for law enforcement by means of logins and passwords. Such access might be provided through a centralized clearinghouse logging access requests and verifying proportionality.

While such models are advantageous from a data protection perspective, they might create a number of challenges and risks for law enforcement. In particular, individualized access requests would be difficult to fathom in view of the fact that one cyber unit might make as many as 50,000 lookups a week. Tracking and tracing law enforcement activity might reveal sensitive data, potentially compromising investigations if revealed or illegally accessed.

In addition, while law enforcement access is not contested, it is unclear whether and how other relevant actors would maintain current levels of access. This concerns in particular cybersecurity authorities, private sector companies and academic researchers; consumer protection authorities, or IP right holders.

3. Recent developments³

Based on consultations with contracted parties, European data protection authorities, legal experts, and interested community stakeholders, ICANN proposed on 12 January 2018, **three potential interim compliance models** with ICANN agreements and policies in relation to the EU's GDPR.⁴ **All three models introduce a variation on layered access to WHOIS data.** The variations of the three models revolve around geographic scope (EU-centric or global), scope of publication of data elements, and third party access to non-public data.

In line with GDPR requirements, ICANN defines five distinct purposes for the WHOIS system, including two specific purposes related to law enforcement needs and investigating cybercrime.

- a. Supporting a framework to address issues involving domain name registrations, including but not limited to: consumer protection, investigation of cybercrime, DNS abuse, and intellectual property protection; and
- b. Providing a framework to address appropriate law enforcement needs.

Regarding law enforcement access to non-public data, ICANN proposed three options:

- i) Self-certification of legitimate interest to be approved by each registry/registrar;
- ii) Certification programme to be developed in consultation with the GAC⁵;
- iii) Court order or legal requirement.

ICANN requested feedback on these interim potential compliance models by 29 January 2018. It intends to decide on and **publish a single model by mid-February 2018**.

 $^{^{3}}$ For an overview of the WHOIS reform issue please see p.11 of the Progress report.

⁴ https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/interim-models-gdpr-compliance-12jan18-en.pdf

⁵ Governmental Advisory Committee of ICANN where all EU Member States are represented together with the European Commission: https://gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/GAC+Representatives

This model will then serve as the standard for ICANN itself and for compliance with the WHOIS obligations under the Registrar and Registry contracts. In practical terms, it will be the one and only WHOIS model.

Among the many contributions received by ICANN, please note the following:

- **GAC Comments** (prepared by the PSWG): https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gdpr-comments-gac-icann-proposed-compliance-models-29jan18-en.pdf
- **European Commission**: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/avramopoulos-et-al-to-marby-29jan18-en.pdf
- **United States:** https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gdpr-comments-usg-icann-proposed-compliance-models-29jan18-en.pdf
- **UK NCA:** https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gdpr-comments-nca-icann-proposed-compliance-models-29jan18-en.pdf
- **WIPO:** https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gdpr-comments-wipo-icann-proposed-compliance-models-29jan18-en.pdf
- **Registrar Stakeholder Group:** https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gdpr-comments-rrsg-icann-proposed-compliance-models-29jan18-en.pdf
- A group of contracted parties (including Donuts, GoDaddy and others): https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gdpr-comments-contracted-icann-proposed-compliance-models-29jan18-en.pdf
- **IPC:** https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gdpr-comments-ipc-icann-proposed-compliance-models-29jan18-en.pdf
- **ECO Association:** https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gdpr-comments-eco-icann-proposed-compliance-models-29jan18-en.pdf

4. Proposal for minimum requirements for LEA access to a future layered access model to domain registration data:

In order to guarantee EU LEA access to essential WHOIS data, the PSWG is seeking to define a **set of minimum requirements** to guarantee timely LEA access to the appropriate elements of a **GDPR-compliant Registration Directory Services (RDS).**

These minimum requirements might also be used as a joint input from the LEA community to the RDAP pilot program currently underway, testing a replacement protocol to WHOIS and which will allow for gated access⁶.

Because a layered access model implies **credentialing**, **authenticating** and **authorizing users** to access data that is not made public and may be hosted in foreign jurisdictions, below is a first series of draft minimum requirements for a future layered access model for discussions.

2.1. Basic principles

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⁶ https://community.icann.org/display/RP/RDAP+Pilot

- The different **legitimate purposes** for which processing of registration data takes place should be clearly and explicitly set out in the policy rules that apply to such processing, from collection to storage and access of data.
- Processing of WHOIS data for law enforcement purposes, e.g. investigating and countering serious crime, fraud, consumer deception, intellectual property violations, and other law violations, constitutes a legitimate interest for processing of personal data. The processing of personal data shall be lawful and necessary for the performance of a task carried out by a competent authority for law enforcement purposes, in line with applicable data protection legal framework.
- These purposes should therefore cover the legitimate need for law enforcement
 access to WHOIS data⁷ to sustain public interests such as cybersecurity; the
 stability, reliability and resilience of the network; preventing and fighting crime;
 protecting intellectual property rights, copyright and consumer rights; and other
 rights recognised in the domestic legal order.
- Registrants should be **informed in a clear and easily understandable manner** about these purposes and the related data processing when making, updating or extending registrations in line with the principle of transparency.

2.2. Necessary data elements

- The model should give nationally-accredited actors, access to all the WHOIS data necessary for the fulfilment of their task, subject to the requirements that should be clearly stated in the processing policy of WHOIS data.
- This includes all current registration information available, public and non-public, personal and non-personal, including email and phone number of registrant, name and postal address of technical and administrative contacts, and billing details, which should continue to be collected by registries and registrars.

2.3. Accreditation system

- Accreditation of Law Enforcement and Public Safety agencies which have a legitimate need to access WHOIS data for the purposes mentioned in 2.1, should be carried out at national level instead of being carried out centrally, e.g. at European or global level.
- The accreditation system should ideally guarantee access for other relevant actors, based on the specific purposes defined pursuant to point 2.1 for processing, including accessing of WHOIS data, comprising non-public elements. This concerns in particular cybersecurity authorities, private sector companies and academic researchers, consumer protection authorities, or intellectual property right holders.
- States should keep an updated list of public (and private entities) located in their respective jurisdiction, which are allowed to access non-public WHOIS data on the basis of relevant domestic legislation. It should be transparent to natural persons that personal data concerning them are collected, used, consulted or

⁷As recognised by ICANN's Bylaws (ICANN Bylaws Article One, Section 1.1; Section 1.2 (a) Commitments and Core Values; Registration Directory Services Review, §4.6(e)

- otherwise processed and to what extent the personal data are or will be processed. Therefore, the list of the public and private entities should be published in a Register which is made accessible to the public.
- This system could be based on the certification programme described by ICANN in relation to the second model of the interim GDPR compliant WHOIS system⁸, provided that programme can accommodate the minimum requirements described in this document. The set of requirements for the issuance of certificates should be clear and transparent.

2.4. Authentication of access

- Authentication mechanisms should be compatible with the rate of look-ups expected from authorised users.
- Nationally-accredited requestors (with a legitimate need to access non-public WHOIS
 data based on domestic law) should be provided with the necessary level of access
 to requested WHOIS data through a unique set of credentials.
- Access WHOIS data needs to be maintained regardless of location of storage. This
 could be achieved in practice through a centralised federated access system,
 e.g. hosted by ICANN.

2.5. Access policy, data location and confidentiality

- Nationally-accredited entities with a legitimate need to access non-public WHOIS data on the basis of domestic law, should have permanent access to WHOIS data on a query basis. Access should not be based on individualised requests justifying the purpose for access, specific data elements sought, nor should it be required to provide a subpoena or any other order from a court or other judicial authority to gain access to non-public WHOIS data.⁹
- There should be sufficient guarantees in place to ensure the implementation of the principle of accountability and purpose limitation. The logging and documentation of the queries and safety of the searches should be made available to the competent oversight authorities for the purposes of verifying the lawfulness of data processing, monitoring and auditing and ensuring proper data integrity and security.
- To ensure confidentiality of the requests, WHOIS data look-ups by nationallyaccredited and authenticated actors should be anonymised, possibly through a system of hashes, be logged by them for audit purposes and they should not be limited by the number of lookups or time.

2.6. Accuracy and validity of data

• As stipulated by the **EU data protection legal framework** and in line with the obligations of contracted parties under their contracts with ICANN, personal data shall be accurate and kept up to date.

⁸ See p. 7 of https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/interim-models-gdpr-compliance-12jan18-en.pdf

⁹ Previously covered under section 2.3

 Every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay (retroactive database data correction with regards to the factual data situation found out during the investigation). To comply with the data quality principle, reasonable steps should be taken to ensure the accuracy of any personal data obtained.

2.7. Data Retention and Record of historical WHOIS data

- In order to ensure the availability of historical WHOIS data, the WHOIS system model should allow access to historical domain data retrospectively. Historical domain and IP ownership information¹⁰ is necessary for the success of investigation by LEA and other parties, and thus an adequate retention policy for historical data should be implemented.
- Such records should also be searchable in such a way as to allow for crossreferencing of information, e.g. where the same data set was used to register several sites.
- In line with the storage limitation principle, data must be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed; personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, or scientific or historical research purposes.

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¹⁰ For example as offered by Domaintools.



Work Plan – 2018-2019 – Final Draft for GAC Endorsement

STRATEGIC GOAL 1 - DEVELOP CYBERCRIME AND DNS ABUSE MITIGATION CAPABILITIES

Develop capabilities of the ICANN and Law Enforcement communities to prevent and mitigate abuse involving the DNS as a key resource

No.	Work Topic	Description/Expected Outcomes	Completion	PSWG Topic Lead	Relevant Stakeholders/Processes/Work Products
1.1	DNS Abuse Reporting	Drive development of effective abuse reporting tools and processes promoting effective policy approaches and proactive industry self-regulation and enabling effective contractual compliance enforcement by ICANN	Q4 2018	Iranga Kahangama (US FBI)	 ICANN <u>Domain Abuse Activity Reporting Project</u> ICANN <u>Identifier Technology Health Index</u> ICANN <u>gTLD Marketplace Health Index</u> <u>SSAC</u> - Establish collaboration mechanisms Statistical Analysis of DNS Abuse GAC DNS Abuse Reporting Principles
1.2	DNS Industry Due Diligence and Prevention	Work with DNS Industry stakeholders and ICANN to: develop tools and mechanisms to prevent abuse in gTLDs; and facilitate law enforcement investigations across borders	2018/2019	Iranga Kahangama (US FBI)	 ICANN <u>Specification 11 3(b) Advisory</u> ICANN <u>Security Framework for Registries to Respond to Security Threats</u> GNSO <u>New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP</u> ICANN <u>Privacy/Proxy Services Accreditation</u>
1.3	Consumer Safeguards	Assist in the developments of ICANN's Safeguards to protect the public; contribute to and follow-up on relevant ICANN Reviews, Review recommendations and implementation, and liaise with the the Consumer Safeguards Director, as appropriate, to work together to achieve our mutual goal to safeguard consumers	2018/2019	Laureen Kapin (US FTC)	 ICANN <u>CCT Review Team</u> – Implementation of Recommendations ICANN <u>SSR 2 Review Team</u> GNSO <u>New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP</u> ICANN <u>Privacy/Proxy Services Accreditation</u>



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No.	Work Topic	Description/Expected Outcomes	Completion	PSWG Topic Lead	Relevant Stakeholders/Processes/Work Products
1.4	Accountability	Review data available on DNS abuse, particularly data available through ICANN's ongoing data collection systems such as DAAR, highlight this data for ongoing policy development efforts so that future policy is informed by relevant data; Ensure that provisions from the contracts related to DNS Abuse are applied and enforced, as well as reviewed and improved, where needed	Ongoing	[TBD]	 ICANN <u>Contractual Compliance</u> team and mechanisms GNSO <u>New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP</u> GNSO <u>Next-Generation Registration Directory Services (RDS) PDP</u> Development of best practices (e.g. Spec 11) Raising awareness within and outside the ICANN Community (incl. cross-community sessions during ICANN meetings)
1.5	Preventing Exploitation of DNS to Perpetuate Abuse	Identify how the DNS is used to perpetuate abuse (including but not limited to DDOS, Botnets, and facilitating distribution of illegal materials such as those associated with counterfeit drugs and child sexual abuse). Consider building upon the ICANN Beijing Communiqué safeguards and development of policies for subsequent gTLD rounds; support proactive action.	Q3 2018	Cathrin Bauer-Bulst (European Commission)	 ICANN <u>Domain Abuse Activity Reporting Project</u> GNSO <u>New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP</u> .KID/.KIDS New gTLDs String Contention ICANN <u>Auction Proceeds Cross-Community Working Group</u>



Work Plan – 2018-2019 – Final Draft for GAC Endorsement

STRATEGIC GOAL 2 - PRESERVE AND IMPROVE DOMAIN REGISTRATION DIRECTORY SERVICES EFFECTIVENESS

Ensure continued accessibility and improved accuracy of domain registration information that is consistent with applicable privacy regulatory frameworks

No.	Work Topic	Description/Expected Outcomes	Completion	PSWG Topic Lead	Relevant Stakeholders/Processes/Work Products
2.1	Access to gTLD Registration Data	Ensure maintenance of swift and effective access to gTLD Registration data for the legitimate needs of civil and criminal law enforcement (including consumer protection authorities) to protect the public and support the public interest	Q2 2018	Laureen Kapin (US FTC)	 ICANN Whois Compliance with GDPR ICANN Procedure for Handling Whois Conflict with Privacy Laws
2.2	Next Generation Protocols and Policies	Guide the exploration of protocols and policies through active participation in relevant processes and timely input, including on law enforcement requirements for accessing layered RDS	2018/2019	Gregory Mounier (Europol)	 ICANN <u>RDAP Pilot Program</u> GNSO <u>Next-Generation Registration Directory</u> <u>Services (RDS) PDP</u>
2.3	Registration Data Accuracy	Continue driving initiatives geared towards increasing the quality of gTLD registration data, including by highlighting and leveraging data quality requirements in data protection legislation	Q4 2018	[TBD]	 ICANN WHOIS Accuracy Reporting System (ARS) ICANN WHOIS Accuracy Program Specification and Registrar Across Field Address Validation GNSO Next-Generation Registration Directory Services (RDS) PDP GNSO New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP ICANN Privacy/Proxy Services Accreditation
2.4	Performance of ICANN's Mission in relation to RDS	Monitor ICANN's performance of its key bylaw responsibilities with regards to accuracy, access and protection of gTLD registration data	2019	Cathrin Bauer-Bulst (European Commission), Lili Sun (Interpol), Thomas Walden (US DEA)	– ICANN <u>RDS Review Team</u>



Work Plan – 2018-2019 – Final Draft for GAC Endorsement

STRATEGIC GOAL 3 - BUILD EFFECTIVE AND RESILIENT PSWG OPERATIONS

No.	Work Topic	Description/Expected Outcomes	Completion	PSWG Topic Lead	Relevant Stakeholders/Processes/Work Products
3.1	Define Strategy and Workplan	Define Strategy and Workplan in alignment with PSWG Terms of Reference, GAC guidance and priorities, and ICANN Bylaws, taking into account current challenges and opportunities	Q1 2018	Cathrin Bauer-Bulst (European Commission)	 PSWG <u>Terms of Reference</u> PSWG Strategy and Workplan Relevant GAC Advice and Principles New ICANN Bylaws
3.2	Strengthen Leadership	Establish a strong and resilient leadership structure to ensure sustained and coherent PSWG activities	Q2 2018	Cathrin Bauer-Bulst (European Commission)	 Endorse Co-chair selection criteria Select New Co-chair Workload distribution among Topics Leads Invite new Topic Leads
3.3	Strengthen Membership	Provide regular and predictable structure of meetings to address the needs of various GAC and PSWG Stakeholders interested in PSWG activities; ensure outreach to stakeholders unable to (regularly) attend ICANN face-to-face meetings; identify opportunities for contribution to the work of the group in supporting the GAC	Q2 2018	[TBD]	 Weekly leadership meetings Monthly working group meetings Intersessional face-to-face feetings Ad hoc topical meetings and webinars for PSWG and GAC Members Outreach activities – Newsletter
3.4	Reporting and Coordination with the GAC	Ensure alignment of PSWG focus and activities with GAC priorities and GAC consensus decision making, by providing regular opportunities for GAC/PSWG leadership coordination and ensuring GAC review and possible endorsement of key PSWG work products	Continuous	[TBD]	 PSWG Activity Report to the GAC GAC briefings and webinars GAC endorsement procedure Establish effective liaison with GAC Leadership



Work Plan – 2018-2019 – Final Draft for GAC Endorsement

STRATEGIC GOAL 4 - DEVELOP PARTICIPATION IN PSWG WORK AND ENSURE STAKEHOLDER INPUT

No.	Work Topic	Description/Expected Outcomes	Completion	PSWG Topic Lead	Relevant Stakeholders/Processes/Work Products
4.1	Continually Assess Operational Needs and Seek Expert Input	Identify current and future policy issues and opportunities in support of the operational needs of public safety agencies. Seek expert input from public safety agencies, through PSWG Members and relevant international organization and forums, to inform contributions to the GAC and relevant ICANN processes	Continuous	[TBD]	 Input from GAC Input from PSWG members Outreach of PSWG members in their agencies, governments and regions Dedicated meetings, webinars and/or conference calls on key topics
4.2	Develop Awareness of PSWG by Government Agencies	Communicate regularly on PSWG activities and achievements that are relevant to national government's priorities in order to secure commitment for effective PSWG membership participation	2019	[TBD]	 PSWG quarterly newsletter GAC capacitybBuilding workshops PSWG monthly calls Outreach of PSWG members within their agencies, governments and regions
4.3	Lowering arriers to Participation	Provide opportunities for effective participation for GAC and PSWG Members, at varying levels of expertise, into PSWG work initiatives	Q3 2018	[TBD]	 PSWG Newsletter and regular calls Leverage GAC website, including access to nonpublic content for PSWG members Repository of ongoing PSWG initiatives, briefings and work products Internal Position Drafting Procedure



Work Plan – 2018-2019 – Final Draft for GAC Endorsement

No.	Work Topic	Description/Expected Outcomes	Completion	PSWG Topic Lead	Relevant Stakeholders/Processes/Work Products
4.4	Develop Onboarding Program	Create tools, information materials and training opportunities for new participants to ICANN and the PSWG to enable them to quickly become effective in a new environment and contribute with their experience and positions; create mentor/buddy system for new members, especially those attending ICANN meetings for first time	Q2 2018	Sara Marcolla (Europol)	 Updated Law Enforcement Guide to ICANN Onboarding package Mentoring System ICANN Meetings Introduction Program ICANN introduction presentation at intersessional meeting



GAC PSWG Intersessional Meeting

12 February 2018



Cathrin Bauer-Bulst chair Greg Mounier Laureen Kapin

Iranga Kahangama

European Commission, PSWG Co-

Europol, PSWG Topic Lead US FTC, PSWG Topic Lead US FBI, PSWG Topic Lead

ICANN GAC PSWG and EMPACT



- Introductions
- Housekeeping
 - Agenda
- A quick introduction of the two groups
 - ICANN GAC PSWG
 - EMPACT
- Internet Governance the special context



What is the Domain WHOIS?



- Publicly available database of registration information on each registrant of a domain name.
- Maintained by ICANN and its contracted registries and registrars.

What information?

- Domain names details: Domain name, IP address, Name server, creation/expiry date, domain status.
- Information on Registrar
- Registrar's URL, registrar's abuse email, phone number.
- Information on registrants (domain name holder)
- Registrant email, postal address, fax and telephone number.
- Administration contact and technical details



Address lookup

canonical name www.vip.icann.org.

aliases www.icann.org

addresses 2620:0:2d0:200::7

192.0.32.7

Domain Whois record

Queried whois.publicinterestregistry.net with "icann.org"...

Domain Name: ICANN.ORG Registry Domain ID: D2347548-LROR Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com Registrar URL: http://www.godaddy.com Updated Date: 2017-12-08T16:40:01Z Creation Date: 1998-09-14T04:00:00Z Registry Expiry Date: 2027-12-07T17:04:26Z Registrar Registration Expiration Date: Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC Registrar IANA ID: 146 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4806242505 Reseller: Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited Domain Status: serverDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverDeleteProhibited Domain Status: serverRenewProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverRenewProhibited Domain Status: serverTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverTransferProhibited Domain Status: serverUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverUpdateProhibited Registry Registrant ID: C67701347-LROR



Use of Domain WHOIS for investigations



- 1. Contact point for domain name (notify)
- 2. Investigative leads on the owner of a domains
- Registrant (name, email, address) = identification, intelligence
- Creation Date, renewal: Recent => DGA? Long time => history check = identification
- **Registrar** = further inquiry (court order)
- Nameserver record = other domain controlled by registrant
 - ★ WHOIS help crime attribution
 - ★ WHOIS is one cyber investigative tool among many others
 - ★ Accurate WHOIS => essential element of online accountability



Case example: Botnet



- Domain registration abuse is at the heart of C2 botnet infrastructure
- New domain names from registrars around the world at fast pace:
 - Sustain takedown requests
 - Sustain sink holing attempts
 - Sustain hijacking attempts
- Banking malware
- WHOIS lookup on domain used to administrate botnet => identify a suspect
- WHOIS lookup on the domain => email address
- Reverse WHOIS lookup => other domains registered with same email
- Domain => Old private website
- Successful arrest and conviction



Short overview of developments




- Since 2003: data protection authorities raised concerns about general public availability of all Whois data
- Several attempts to reform Whois policy
- Impending entry into force of General Data Protection Regulation has advanced the process
- November 2017: announcement of potential suspension of compliance
- January 2018:
 - ICANN presentation of 3 possible models
 - Community models submitted in parallel
- In the next days/weeks: announcement of chosen model
 - Will likely be applied horizontally across all contracted parties
 - ICANN cannot force contracted parties to violate laws further exceptions possible





Proposed Interim GDPR Compliance Models and Selected Community Input (Working Draft)



More on the cited models, including community comments at: https://go.icann.org/gdprlegal

Source: ICANN 2 Feb. 2018 Webinar materials and recording, available at: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/data-protection-meetings-2017-12-08-en



GDPR Compliant Whois - Key Issues for LEA



- Collection
 - Requirements for Registries and Registrars
 - Public/Non Public Display of data elements
- Access
 - For law enforcement
 - For other parties supporting law enforcement investigation
- Retention
 - Historical records
 - Bulk Access



ICANN Model 1		ICANN Model 2	ICANN Model 3	
Natural person Legal person		Legal and Natural persons	Legal and natural persons	
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	Display	Display	Display	Display

Registrant

Domain Name

Registrar URL

Updated Date

Creation Date Registry Expiry Data

Registrar

Phone

Reseller

Domain Status Domain Status

Domain Status

Registrant Name Registrant Organization

Registrant Street

Registrant City

Registry Registrant ID

Registrant State/Province

Registrant Postal Code

Registrant Country

Registrant Phone Ext

Registrant Phone

Registrant Fax Ext

Registrant Email

Admin Organization

Admin State/Province

Admin Postal Code

Admin Country

Admin Phone Ext

Admin Phone

Admin Fax Ext Admin Email

Tech Organization

Tech State/Province

Tech Postal Code

Tech Country

Tech Phone Ext

Tech Phone

Tech Fax

Tech Fax Ext

Name Server

Name Server

DNSSEC DNSSEC

Tech Email

Admin Fax

Tech Name

Tech Street

Tech City

Admin Name

Admin Street

Admin City

Registrant Fax

Registry Domain ID

Registrar WHOIS Server

Registrar Registration **Expiration Date**

Registrar Abuse Contact Email

Registrar Abuse Contact

Registrar IANA ID


Appendix 1: Summary Comparison Chart of Proposed Interim GDPR Compliance Models


	"	terim GDPR Compliance Mod							
	Model 1	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 3					
Collection from									
Registrant to	Full Thick Data								
Registrar									
Data Transfer from									
Registrar to		Full transfer of T	hick Data						
Registry									
Data Transfer to		Full transfer of existing i	registration data						
Escrow Agents		· ·							
Public WHOIS	Display all current Thick Data,	Display only Thin Data +	Display only Thin Data +	Do not display any					
	except do not display: (1) email	email address for Admin	email address for Tech and	personal data in any					
	and phone number of	and Tech contacts (do not	Admin contacts (do not	registration					
	registrant, and (2) name and	publish the name or any	publish the name or any						
	postal address of tech and	other data about any	other data about any						
	admin contacts	registrant)	registrant)						
Access to Non-	Self-certification - any 3rd party	Formal accreditation –	Formal accreditation as	Legal due process –					
Public WHOIS Data	requestor would identify the	Establish a certification	described in Model 2A.	third parties would be					
	specific purpose/need for	program for certain user		required to provide a					
	accessing non-public WHOIS	groups, such as law		subpoena or any other					
	data and self-certify that access	enforcement agencies and		order from a court or					
	is necessary for the purposes of	intellectual property		other judicial tribunal o					
	the legitimate interests	lawyers, and registries and		competent jurisdiction					
	pursued by the requestor.	registrars must provide		to gain access to non-					
	Upon approval by the registry	"certified" requestors		public WHOIS data.					
	or registrar, the requestor	access to non-public Whois		,					
	would agree/certify that it	data based on pre-defined							
	would only use data for the	criteria and limitations. The							
	limited purpose approved.	user groups eligible for the							
	(Note: the approval process	certification program and							
	could be likened to the process	the process for providing							
	for registries to approve access	access to be developed in							
	to 3 rd parties for zone file data.)	consultation with the GAC							
	Registries and registrars may	so that public policy							
	provide additional access as	considerations are taken							
	long as it complies with the	into account. Registries and							
	GDPR and other applicable	registrars may provide							
	laws.	additional access as long as							
		it complies with the GDPR							
		and other applicable laws.							
Scope/Applicability	Applies to personal data	Applies to registrations	Applies to all registrations	Applies to all					
of Model	included in registrations of	without regard to whether	on a global basis without	registrations on a globa					
	natural persons where	the registrant is a natural or	regard to location of	basis as described in					
	registrant, registry, registrar or	legal person, where the	registry, registrar	Model 2B.					
	processing activities are carried	registrant, registry, registrar	registrant, and processing						
	out in the European Economic	or a processor are located in	activities, and without						
	Area.	the European Economic	regard to type of						
		Area.	registrant. (Note: this						
			option provides a blanket						
			interim solution to provide						
			a single, consistent						
			approach across the						
			board.)						
Data Retention	Life of registration + 2 years	Life of registration + 1 year	Life of registration + 1 year	Life of registration + 60					
				days					


Source: ICANN Proposed Interim Models (12 Jan. 2018), available at:


https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/interim-models-gdpr-compliance-12jan18-en.pdf

	ICANN Model 1		ICANN Model 2 Legal and Natural	ICANN Model 3				Mode		G Proposal)	
Registrant	Natural person	Legal person	persons	Legal and natural persons		Registrant	Natural person	Legal person	_	natural persons	
Domain Name	Display	Display	Display	Display		Domain Name	Display	Display			1
Registry Domain ID	Display	Display	Display	Display		Registry Domain ID	Display	Display			l
Registrar WHOIS Server	Display	Display	Display	Display		Registrar WHOIS Server	Display	Display			ш
Registrar URL	Display	Display	Display	Display		Registrar URL	Display	Display			
Updated Date	Display	Display	Display	Display		Updated Date	Display	Display			
Creation Date	Display	Display	Display	Display		Creation Date	Display	Display			
Registry Expiry Data	Display	Display	Display	Display		Registry Expiry Data	Display	Display			
Registrar Registration						Registrar Registration					
Expiration Date	Display	Display	Display	Display		Expiration Date	Display	Display			
Registrar	Display	Display	Display	Display		Registrar	Display	Display			
Registrar IANA ID	Display	Display	Display	Display		Registrar IANA ID	Display	Display			
Registrar Abuse Contact Email	Display	Display	Display	Display		Registrar Abuse Contact Email	Display	Display			
Registrar Abuse Contact						Registrar Abuse Contact					
Phone	Display	Display	Display	Display		Phone	Display	Display			
Reseller	Display	Display	Display	Display		Reseller	Display	Display			
Domain Status	Display	Display	Display	Display		Domain Status	Display	Display			
Domain Status	Display	Display	Display	Display		Domain Status	Display	Display			
Domain Status	Display	Display	Display	Display		Domain Status	Display	Display			
Registry Registrant ID	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Do not display		Registry Registrant ID	Do not display	Display			
Registrant Name	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant Name	Display	Display			
Registrant Organization	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant Organization	Display	Display			
Registrant Street	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant Street	Display	Display			
Registrant City	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data	l	Registrant City	Display	Display	l		1
Registrant State/Province	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant State/Province	Display	Display			
Registrant Postal Code	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant Postal Code	Display	Display			
Registrant Country	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant Country	Display	Display			
Registrant Phone	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant Phone		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Registrant Phone Ext	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant Phone Ext		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Registrant Fax	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant Fax		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Registrant Fax Ext	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant Fax Ext		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Registrant Email	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Registrant Email	Display	Display			
Admin Name	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin Name		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Admin Organization	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin Organization		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Admin Street	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin Street		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Admin City	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin City		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Admin State/Province	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin State/Province		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Admin Postal Code	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin Postal Code		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Admin Country	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin Country		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Admin Phone	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin Phone	Display	Display			
Admin Phone Ext	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin Phone Ext	Display	Display			
Admin Fax	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin Fax	Display	Display			
Admin Fax Ext	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin Fax Ext	Display	Display			
Admin Email	Display	Display	Display	Display unless field includes personal data		Admin Email	Display	Display			
Tech Name	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech Name		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Tech Organization	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech Organization		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Tech Street	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech Street		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Tech City	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech City		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Tech State/Province	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech State/Province		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	
Tech Postal Code	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data	İ	Tech Postal Code	İ	Display	İ	Display unless field includes personal data	ij
Tech Country	Do not display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech Country		Display		Display unless field includes personal data	1
Tech Phone	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech Phone	Display	Display			
Tech Phone Ext	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech Phone Ext	Display	Display			
Tech Fax	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech Fax	Display	Display			
Tech Fax Ext	Display	Display	Do not display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech Fax Ext	Display	Display			
Tech Email	Display	Display	Display	Display unless field includes personal data		Tech Email	Display	Display			I
Name Server	Display	Display	Display	Display		Name Server	Display	Display			
Name Server	Display	Display	Display	Display		Name Server	Display	Display			
DNSSEC	Display	Display	Display	Display		DNSSEC	Display	Display			1
DNSSEC	Display	Display	Display	Display		DNSSEC	Display	Display			1
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Law Enforcement Needs



- How many Whois lookups do you make per month? How many lookups does your unit or other units or agencies make?
- Do you use bulk lookup (Port 43), e.g. to download large amounts of Whois data?
- Do you rely on external services provided by private companies in relation to Whois, e.g. DomainTools or others?
- Do you use cross-referencing of Whois data fields, e.g. to identify other domains that were registered using the same information? How often is this used?
- Which data fields are important for your investigations?
- Do you have experience using gated access systems, e.g. on the basis of credentials assigned to you personally or to your organisation?
 Which requirements exist for your organisation?



Public Safety Considerations for layered access (1)



1. Accreditation system:

- Accreditation of LE and Public Safety agencies with a legitimate need to access non-public WHOIS data should be carried out at national level.
- Nationally-accredited actors should have access to all the WHOIS data necessary for the fulfilment of their task.
- Guarantee access for other relevant actors: CSIRTs, cybersecurity companies, academic researchers, consumer protection authorities, IP right holders.
- States = updated list of public and private entities located in their jurisdiction which are allowed to access non-public WHOIS data (public register).
- Set of requirements for issuance of accreditation/certificate should be clear, transparent and set at ICANN level.



Public Safety Considerations for layered access (2)



2. Authentication and access policy:

- Centralised federated access system = provide access based on the list of nationally-authenticated requestors maintained by States.
- Accreditation should be valid for all registries.
- Nationally-accredited requestors = access through unique set of credentials. (one per agency? One per State?)
- No limit on number of queries + single and bulk access
- Web interface and use of command lines of scripts



Public Safety Considerations for layered access (3)




3. Confidentiality:

- Queries = anonymised at central level (ensure confidentiality of requests + protect investigation)
- Logging of queries = at national level + Logs = available to national competent oversight authorities.

4. Data retention and historical WHOIS data

- Ensure availability of historical WHOIS
- What is adequate data retention policy? (no longer than necessary).
- Registries/registrars to keep the records? Where is WHOIS data physically stored?





Authentication/Tracking - Key Issues for LEA



- How to ensure confidentiality of access (logging of requests)?
- What Audit Trail (Data Protection Accountability Requirement)?
- Remedy against abuse of LEA access ?
 - Complaint-based system ?
 - Revocation Mechanism



Widespread Abuse is not Inevitable


Abuse is neither universal nor wholly random

Registration restrictions: Stricter registration policies correlated with lower levels of abuse

Price matters: operators associated with the highest rates of abuse offered low price domain name registrations

Trademarks as bait: Maliciously registered domain names often contained strings related to trademarked terms


The Data Shows a Policy Gap



Nanjing Imperiosus Technology (China)

- More than 93% of the new gTLD registrations sold by Nanjing appeared on SURBL's blacklists.
- ICANN eventually suspended Nanjing in January 2017, citing its failure to comply with the Whois verification, abuse reporting, and record keeping requirements of the RAA and failure to pay ICANN fees.
- However, the sustained, unabated, high abuse rates alone did not constitute grounds for suspension.

The Data Shows a Policy Gap



Alphames Ltd. (Gibraltar)

- Associated with a high volume of abuse from .SCIENCE and .TOP domain names.
- Used price promotions that offered domain name registrations for \$1 USD or sometimes even free.
- Permitted registrants to randomly generate and register 2,000 domain names in 27 new gTLDs in a single registration process.
- Bulk domain names using domain generation algorithms are commonly associated with cybercrime.
- Alpnames remains ICANN-accredited.

Key Questions for Discussion



- 1. How do we identify DNS Abuse in a reliable way?
- 2. How to create effective and transparent Abuse Reporting?
- 3. How could Abuse Reporting support registries and registrars in their prevention and mitigation efforts? How could it be used in contractual compliance enforcement? How could it be used in policy making?



Overview of ICANN and the DNS ecosystem



ICANN

Jean-Jacques Sahel

PSWG / Europol workshop Brussels, 12 February 2018

Overview

- What is ICANN's role?
- How does it work? ICANN's Multi-stakeholder structure, including the GAC – Governments in ICANN
- Contractual relationship with Registries and Registrars and the Policy development process
- DNS Abuse and awareness DAAR








Our Technical Partners

Coordinating with our technical partners, we help make the Internet work.





ICANN's focus: Unique Names and Numbers

Anything connected to the Internet – including computers, mobile phones and other devices – has a unique number called its IP address. IP stands for Internet Protocol.





This address is like a postal address. It allows messages, videos and other packets of data to be sent from anywhere on the Internet to the device that has been uniquely identified by its IP address.

IP addresses can be difficult to remember, so instead of numbers, the Internet's domain name system uses letters, numbers and hyphens, to form a name that is easier to remember.





ICANN's Mission

The mission of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems

Specifically, ICANN:



Coordinates the allocation and assignment of names in the root zone of the Domain Name System



Coordinates the development and implementation of policies concerning the registration of second-level domain names in generic top-level domains (gTLDs)



Facilitates the coordination of the operation and evolution of the DNS root name server system



Coordinates the allocation and assignment at the top-most level of Internet Protocol numbers & Autonomous System numbers



Collaborates with other bodies as appropriate to provide registries needed for the functioning of the Internet as specified by Internet protocol standards development organizations







The ICANN Multistakeholder Community

ICANN follows a bottom-up, multistakeholder model

in which individuals, noncommercial stakeholder groups, industry, and governments

play important roles in its community-based, consensusdriven, policymaking approach.





https://www.icann.org/community



The ICANN Community



There are three supporting organizations in the ICANN community, representing: IP addresses. generic top-level domains (gTLDs), and country code top-level domains (ccTLDs).


They develop policy recommendations in their respective areas.

There are four advisory committees that give advice and recommendations. These are comprised of representatives of governments and international treaty organizations; representatives of root server operators; Internet security experts and Internet endusers.






Supporting Organizations (SOs)






Advisory Committees (ACs)






Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC)





How Does the Community Develop Policy?












DNS Industry: Key Stakeholders






Registries and Registrars

To make sure you get to the correct Internet address, ICANN has contracts with domain name registering companies (Registrars) and organizations responsible for operating Top-Level domains longer than two characters (Registries) around the world





DNS Industry and ICANN: Contracts



Contractual Compliance

- Contracts are enforced through Contractual Compliance.
- The mission is to preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the Domain Name System and to promote consumer trust through prevention, transparency and enforcement







Security (SSR) awareness


Raising user awareness is part of ICANN's overall and security, stability, and resiliency (SSR) remit and includes:

- Data reporting on DNS (Domain name) Abuse
- Data sharing to assist operations or security activities
- Collaboration with the public safety community (e.g., investigations, training)
- Security knowledge transfer



Data Reporting on Domain Name System (DNS) Abuse


- A system for reporting on domain name registration and abuse data across TLD registries and registrars
- The purpose of this project is to provide ICANN community with data to support consensus policy development



DAAR reflects how parties external to ICANN community see the domain ecosystem



Data Set: All gTLDs having at least 1 reported abuse domain





Where is Abuse Concentrated in New TLDs?

Exploited New TLDs MAY 2017	Abuse Domains Reported to DAAR	New TLD Program Resolving Domains for Which DAAR Obtains Data
5 most exploited new TLDs	56%	22%
10 most exploited new TLDs	73%	34%
25 most exploited new TLDs	97%	70%

SEP 2017	Abuse Domains Reported to DAAR	New TLD Program Resolving Domains for Which DAAR Obtains Data
5 most exploited new TLDs	53%	26%
10 most exploited new TLDs	71%	48%
25 most exploited new TLDs	95%	67%

TLDs for which no abuse domains were reported are not included in the counts

Latest report :

https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/presentation-daar-31oct17-en.pdf



Next

- ICANN61 Puerto Rico, March 10-15
- GDD Summit, Vancouver 14-17 May 2018



• ICANN62



• ICANN63 in Barcelona, 20 - 26 October: 20th AGM; 4th High Level Government Meeting



Get Involved and Informed



Attend an ICANN Public
Meeting. Three times a year,
ICANN holds free and open
public meetings in different
regions around the world. Visit
meetings.icann.org to
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Visit go.icann.org/journey
to learn how you can attend
an ICANN Public Meeting
as part of the
NextGen@ICANN or ICANN
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Attend events in your region.



Find and participate in an ICANN community group by visiting icann.org/community.



Sign up for ICANN news alerts and regional newsletters.



Thank you and questions



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ICANN's Mission

In performing its Mission, ICANN will act in a manner that complies with and reflects ICANN's Commitments and respects ICANN's Core Values

These Commitments and Core Values include:









www.icann.org







Data Sharing: Open Data Initiative

- ICANN Open Data Initiative
 - Facilitates access to data that ICANN organization or community creates or curates (zone data, protocol registries)
 - Access in machine- and human friendly formats
 - Data registries that ICANN curates includes:
 - Top level domain delegations
 - Accredited registrar
 - Internet protocol registries (databases)
- One of the goals: to improve collaboration with operational security communities, participation in ICANN



Operational Security data sharing

- As part of daily operational security activities, ICANN staff
 - Exchange public information with private or public sector investigators to assist in global threat mitigation
 - Facilitate cooperation between domain name ecosystem parties, law enforcement and court systems that are instrumental in executing multi-jurisdictional actions against criminal operations or conspiracies



Security knowledge transfer

- ICANN's Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO) publishes data, research papers, or reports to inform the Internet community about:
 - Evolving cyber-threat landscape
 - Advisories or analyses of incidents affecting the DNS
 - Security Awareness articles
 - Research papers, technical articles in cybersecurity or Internet technology journals

